University of New Mexico

UNM Digital Repository
NotiSur

Latin America Digital Beat (LADB)

1-15-1999

Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori Looks to
Recapture Magic
Guest Author

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/notisur
Recommended Citation
Guest Author. "Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori Looks to Recapture Magic." (1999). https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/notisur/
12592

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Latin America Digital Beat (LADB) at UNM Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in NotiSur by an authorized administrator of UNM Digital Repository. For more information, please contact amywinter@unm.edu.

LADB Article Id: 54457
ISSN: 1060-4189

Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori Looks to Recapture
Magic
by Guest
Category/Department: Peru
Published: 1999-01-15
[Lucien Chauvin is a staff writer with Latinamerica Press, a weekly bilingual publication in Lima,
Peru.]
Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori is trying hard to rediscover the magic that characterized much
of his first few years in office, but which has become increasingly elusive as he moves toward
the end of his second term. Throughout last year the president made changes to his political and
economic team in an attempt to reverse negative poll numbers that have plagued his administration
since early 1997.
Cabinet chiefs and economic ministers came and went in 1998, but the president's popularity
remained below 30% and sunk lower with each change. In a year-end poll by the firm Analistas y
Consultores, only 29% of those polled said they believed in what the president said. When asked
who they would vote for if presidential elections, scheduled for April 2000, were held today, only
12.8% said Fujimori, placing him in a distant third place.
While Peruvian political analysts are at odds about the long-term significance of the most recent
administration changes, most agree that a new Cabinet, sworn in Jan. 5, 1999, is aimed at improving
the president's image with Peru's 24.5 million people. The Cabinet will be led by Victor Joy Way,
who stepped down as speaker of Peru's 120-member unicameral Congress, to take the post as
finance minister. Within the Peruvian political system, the minister chosen by the president to lead
the Cabinet is given special powers similar to those of a prime minister. If the Cabinet chief resigns,
for example, all ministers must tender their resignations.
Joy Way, a longtime Fujimori ally who was industry minister until 1992, is seen as less of a
technocrat than his immediate predecessors. Analysts such as economist Oscar Ugarteche expect
Joy Way to take a much more hands-on approach to the economy. The economy is Fujimori's most
pressing problem, and he took advantage of Joy Way's swearing-in to say that the new Cabinet
will have three fundamental tasks: reduction of extreme poverty, reduction of unemployment, and
sustained economic growth with jobs.
Fujimori also said the Cabinet was taking on the complex job of reviving economic growth and
increasing needed social programs. Peru's economic model is in need of repair Getting Peru's
economy growing again is key to maintaining the model in place since Fujimori first took office in
July 1990. Campaigning against neoliberalism, Fujimori scored an upset victory against author Mario
Vargas Llosa.
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Once elected, however, he enacted one of the most sweeping neoliberal programs in the world. The
model worked well to combat inflation, which topped 7,000% in 1990, and brought confidence and
foreign investment to the country. Susana de la Puente, a Peruvian vice president at US investment
firm J.P. Morgan and a Fujimori supporter, says that for the Peruvian model to work the economy
must grow by at least 4% a year. This did not happen in 1997 or 1998, and optimistic predictions
for 1999 forecast only 3% growth. A main criticism of the model is that economic benefits have not
"trickled down" to the poor, who number more than 50% of the population.
While Fujimori has traditionally brushed off critics as bureaucrats wanting a return to the days of a
bloated central government, statistics showing an increase in Peruvians living in poverty evidently
convinced the president to at least consider different options as the 2000 presidential elections
approach. While the bulk of Peru's economic problems during the past 16 months can be tied in
part to the effects of El Nino—which caused nearly US$2 billion in damage to infrastructure, homes,
and crops—the country's recession was in the works long before El Nino's warm-water current
came ashore, and Peruvians blame Fujimori's economic policies for their current troubles. GDP
grew by only 1% in 1998, the trade deficit increased by nearly US$1 billion to US$2.7 billion, and
international hard-currency reserves fell.
Although inflation was at a 25-year low, closing the year at 6%, the improvement was not felt by
most Peruvians because a 15% devaluation in the local currency, the nuevo sol, eroded buying
power. Fujimori, Joy Way, and the administration's Cambio 90-Nueva Mayoria bloc in Congress say
the new economic strategy will not stray from the current model, but will get the most out of each
dollar spent.
The US$1 billion set aside for El Nino reconstruction and potential saving from cutbacks in some
ministries, such as defense, are expected to be used to shore up social programs and aid the cashstrapped economy. The opposition, however, has a different take on the changes. Oscar Ugarteche,
who worked with Fujimori early on but has been a staunch critic for years, says that with Joy Way's
appointment the government will open the purse strings and pump money into the economy.
Congressman Javier Alva Orlandini, of the opposition Accion Popular party, does not expect many
changes. He says the government will talk about change and make some minor adjustments, but the
central elements of the financial policy will remain the same.
What Ugarteche, Alva Orlandini, and most Peruvians agree on, however, is that the changes are
pegged to the April 2000 elections. The next presidential elections are intimately tied to the way
Fujimori has run the country for the past eight years. Elected as an independent in 1990 with no
institutional support and little sympathy for political parties, Fujimori quickly found an ally in the
armed forces, on whom he increasingly relied. Any doubts about the Fujimori-military alliance were
eliminated in April 1992 when the president pulled off his "self-coup," closing down Congress and
the judicial branch and ruling by degree (see NotiSur, 09/08/92).
Fujimori's popularity soared in the wake of the self-coup, topping 70%. The president's political
risk paid off quickly on both the political and economic fronts. Only five months after the self-coup,
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police arrested the leaders of Sendero Luminoso and the Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru
(MRTA), the country's main subversive groups that had been on the offensive for years, and the
economy began to show signs of a comeback. A Constitutional Assembly, elected toward the end of
1992, ensured compliance with the president's policies (see NotiSur, 01/14/94). The assembly crafted
a new Constitution that eliminated many state functions, placing the economy squarely in the freemarket camp.
The most talked about change, and one that continues to raise tempers, was the approval of
presidential re-election (see NotiSur, 04/14/95). With the economy growing at its fastest pace in
years, terrorism on the wane, and confidence in the country high, Fujimori easily won re-election in
1995. The 1995 election cycle, however, is still being felt today. Critics charge that Fujimori unfairly
used the public treasury to ensure his victory.
Former finance minister Carlos Bolona has labeled the budget during the campaign year the
"electoral feast," and claims that uncontrolled spending to ensure Fujimori's victory is one of the
main elements of the current fiscal crisis. Complaints about the 1995 election pale, however, in
comparison to the warnings of an impending fraud in the 2000 contest.

Fujimori, opposition prepare ground for 2000 election
While Fujimori was still savoring his 1995 victory, his colleagues in Congress were already planning
to make sure he stayed in office well into the 21st century.Since 1996, the Fujimori-dominated
Congress has been interpreting laws and passing new ones to put the president's name on the ballot
in April 2000 (see NotiSur, 08/23/96).
For two years a civic group known as the Foro Democratico, as well as opposition parties, collected
signatures to bring the question of Fujimori's re-election to the voters in a referendum. But Fujimori
allies acted fast, bringing a court injunction against the referendum process in July. Congress voted
Aug. 27 to shelve the referendum, clearing another hurdle for Fujimori to run again.
For Ugarteche and many other analysts, the choice of Joy Way as finance minister at this time,
coupled with earlier announcements such as a raise in the minimum wage for public employees in
April 1999, are aimed at eliminating the remaining hurdle to Fujimori's re-election voter rejection.
Populist economic policies, even tame, could help the chance for victory. "Joy Way will try to inject
some money into the Peruvian economy to ensure Fujimori's re-election," Ugarteche said. Other
analysts are floating an alternative scenario, saying that Fujimori has tapped Joy Way to groom him
as a replacement in 2000. For the majority coalition, however, little matters except Fujimori's reelection.
Deputy Ricardo Marcenaro, who replaced Joy Way as head of Congress, says that Fujimori will run
and win in 2000. He pointed to the new Cabinet, which includes three women, as an example of the
president's broad appeal to independents. Ugarteche disagrees with this analysis, saying that by
tapping Joy Way the administration has shown that his regime has run out of steam and support.
"When governments reach their end, they begin to close in on themselves and start replacing
ministers, choosing people close to them because no one else wants the job," Ugarteche said.
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While 60% of Peruvians list the economy as the country's number one problem, it is not the only
trouble spot, and analysts say all the Cabinet changes in the world will not improve Fujimori's
approval ratings in key areas such as democracy and separation of powers. A major area of concern
is independence within the judicial branch, which the government has chosen to blatantly ignore.
In mid-1998, the World Bank suspended a US$22 million loan for judicial reform, citing government
interference in the justice department, and an Organization of American States (OAS) delegation
that visited Peru in November said government meddling in the judiciary jeopardized institutional
stability in the country.
Troubles with the justice system have given Peru the sad honor of being the country with the
most cases pending before the OAS' Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Fourteen cases have
been brought against the Peruvian state in the court. Giovanna Penaflor, head of the polling firm
Imasen, says she does not think any Cabinet changes will restore institutional order in the country.
"I do not think there are changes that can regain the country's institutional structure," she said.
"Furthermore, there is the risk of measures being adopted to hamper anyone who might appear to
threaten re-election."

President's successes go largely unnoticed
The president's low numbers in the polls come despite several diplomatic successes throughout
the year. The major event for the administration was the late October signing of a peace agreement
between Peru and Ecuador, ending more than 50 years of border troubles (see NotiSur, 10/30/98).
While Fujimori declared a national holiday Oct. 26 expecting people to celebrate, in the northern city
of Iquitos people took to the streets to protest the agreement. Six people were killed in the violence.
The reaction was not so much against the accord as the way in which the government negotiated
and presented its final results.
While Ecuadoran President Jamil Mahuad traveled his country explaining the implications of
the agreement, Fujimori's administration announced the accords with fanfare, but refused to do
anything more. The government was mortified by the violence in Iquitos and by public opinion
polls showing that a majority of Peruvians rejected the accords. Fujimori went as far as to call the
protesters in Iquitos "traitors."
Another major success that went unnoticed in the country because of political wheeling and dealing
was the massive reduction in crops used to produce drugs and in drug trafficking. In the past two
years, Peru has eradicated more than 50% of its coca fields. While the US government has praised
Peru's anti-narcotics efforts, what most Peruvians remember is a scandal involving US drug czar
Gen. Barry McCaffrey and Fujimori's shadowy security advisor Vladimiro Montesinos. McCaffrey
denounced as a sham a video aired on local television that purported to show friendly relations
between McCaffrey and Montesinos.
The government's need to work hard to put a positive spin on issues that should have popular
support is a sign to analysts and opposition politicians that Fujimori's teflon coating has worn thin.
But while the president's numbers continue down in the polls, the opposition remains divided and,
as the 2000 elections approach, any cooperation that may exist could quickly dissolve. Fujimori has
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defined the final decade of the century in Peru and whether or not he is a candidate in 2000, he will
be a defining presence well into the 21st century.

-- End --
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